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in general must be viewed and if an occasional hardship occurs it is not
the duty of the court to invalidate the law on that ground as long as the
means adopted have a reasonable relation to the end to be attained.
In re People, 264 N.Y. 69, i9o N.E. 153, 96 A.L.R. 297 (1934);
Nebbia v. People of New York, 291 U.S. 502, 78 L. Ed. 940, 54 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 505 (1933).
The Ohio legislature had before it during a recent session a bill
substantially the same as the one now in effect in Indiana, 9ist G. A.,
H.B. No. 17o. This was rejected. The decision in the principal case
will, no doubt, be helpful to the legislature should a similar bill be
presented in the future. It seems as if the Ohio courts should have no
more difficulty upholding such a law than did the New York court.
The same constitutional problems that would arise here were discussed
and passed upon in the principal case. PHILIP J. WOLF
DECEIT
DECEIT - NECESSITY OF SCIENTER OR. NEGLIGENCE IN ADDI-
TION TO FALSITY
In December, 1929, the plaintiff purchased from Willis F. Walker,
a farm represented to contain 87.883 acres and described in the deed
as containing 87.883 acres "more or less." It had been khown for
years as an 88-acre farm, was on the tax duplicate as such and had
been so recorded in an old atlas for the county. The plaintiff discovered
after living on the premises for more than four years, that they con-
tained 25 acres less than his grantor had supposed and brought action
for damages for the deficiency. The court held that in order to recover,
the purchaser must prove either actual fraud upon the part of the vendor,
or that the vendor's representations were of a character which from
their nature showed that he must have known them to be untrue, or
that he was guilty of culpable negligence amounting to fraud. Pilegar v.
WValker, 54 Ohio App. 262, Ohio Bar, March 8, 1937.
The courts in this country are not in accord as to whether the
plaintiff, in order to maintain an action of deceit, must show that the
false statement was made with knowledge of its falsity, or whether a
false statement negligently made will constitute a basis for the action, or
whether a false statement, without either scienter or negligence, will be
sufficient. The majority of the states follow the view of the English
case, Peek v. Derry, 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889), in holding that knowl-
edge, by the one making the statement, of its falsity is an essential
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element of a deceit action; that is to say that the problem is one of
ascertaining the actual belief of the one making the representation.
Griswold v. Gebbie, 126 Pa. 353, 17 Ad. 673, 12 Am. St. Rep. 878
(1889); Colorado Springs Company v. Wight, 44 Co1. 179, 96 Pac.
820, 16 Ann. Cas. 644 and note (19o8); Hindman v. Louisville Na-
tionulBank, 112 Fed. 931, 50 C.C.A. 623, 57 L.R.A. lo8 (1902);
Endsley v. Johns, 120 Ill. 469, 12 N.E. 247, 6o Am. Rep. 572
(1887); Sallis v. Johnson, 85 Conn. 77, 8I Ad. 974, Ann. Cas. 1913
A. 386 (1911). Another line of cases have held that the statement of
a fact which the party has no reasonable ground to believe true is fraud-
ulent, even though in fact believed. Howe v. Martin, 23 Okla. 561,
lO2 Pac. 128, 138 A.S.R. 840 (19o9); Linscott v. Orient Insurance
Company, 88 Me. 497, 34 Ad. 405, 5V A.S.R. 435 (1896); Erie City
Iron Works v. Barber, io6 Pa. 125, 5 Am. Rep. 508 (1884). There
is authority for the doctrine that a falsity alone, without either knowl-
edge or negligence is sufficient. Palmer v. Golberg, 128 Wis. 103, 107
N.W. 478 (19o6); Walters v. Eaves, 105 Ga. 584, 32 S.E. 6o9
(1899).
Ohio's position on the question is by no means clearly defined, nor
is the problem often met directly and discussed in the cases. An accu-
rate interpretation of the language used in the opinions is thus rendered
more difficult. In some cases, confusion results from a failure to dis-
tinguish between that which is evidence of fraud and that which consti-
tutes it.
One group of the cases holds that a fraudulent purpose must be
shown to have been entertained, though not designating the same degree
of conscious motive. In Miller v. Forest City Motor Co., 23 Ohio App.
266, 153 N.E. 905 (1926), it is said a knowledge of "guilt" must be
proved. An early case after stating the requirement of fraudulent pur-
pose to be proved by direct evidence or at least knowledge of the falsity,
says in qualification: "Indeed it is not necessary to show he knew the
fact represented to be untrue if no reasonable grounds for the belief
exist." Apparently, in the latter statement the court is referring to
method of proof and not the ultimate test; if not, the statement seems
to be contradictory. Nugent v. Cincinnati H. & L Straight Line Rail-
way Co., 2 Disn. 302, 13 Ohio Dec. Rep. 185 (1858). Another
decision is to the effect that one who makes representations founded on
information from persons having direct knowledge and after he has
made direct inquiry, with implicit belief in the statements is not liable.
Belmont Mining Co. v. Rogers, Ohio C.0. 305, 6 Ohio C.D. 619
(1895). Frequently a knowledge of the falsity is recited in dicta as an
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essential element. Bank of St. Clairsville v. Beebe, 6 Ohio 497 (1834);
Spencer v. King, 3 Ohio N.P. 270, 5 Ohio D.N.P. 113 (1896); State
ex. rel. Ireton v.Dolle, 5 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 248, 17 Ohio D.N.P. 307
(1907).
Something less than conscious purpose to defraud has been deemed
sufficient in most of the Ohio cases. Taylor v. Leith, 26 Ohio St. 428
(1875), while saying bad faith must be shown, clearly indicates belief
would be insufficient to exonerate if the facts were not such as to justify
the belief. It is necessary to establish that defendant knew the repre-
sentations to be false or by the exercise of reasonable care, ought to have
known it. Mason v. Moore, 73 Ohio St. 275, 4 L.R.A. (N.S.) 597,
76 N.E. 932, 4 Ann. Cas. 240 (i9o6); Hellesheimer v. Swisher, 7
Ohio L. Rep. 629, 56 Bull. 71; Atkinson v. Braddock, 14 Ohio App.
205, 32 Ohio C.A. 58 (1920). The court says in the Braddock case,
supra, the test is not the abstract belief or state of mind of the person
charged with such knowledge but the objective one of what a reason-
ably prudent man would have believed under all the circumstances.
Approval may be found, also, for the third view, if a possible con-
struction is placed on certain words of the court in Gleason v. Bell, 91
Ohio St. 268, 11o N.E. 513 (1915), after which they quote Bigelow
on Fraud saying: "A positive statement implies knowledge and if the
party who makes it has no knowledge on the subject, he has told scienter
what is untrue." Probably the court meant to base its decision on
defendant's negligence in failing to know what he should have known,
but the former interpretation is evidently placed on it in Fries v. Gan-
non, 9 Ohio App. 387 (1918), where it is regarded as authority for a
decision in which reasonable care under the circumstances is not made
an issue. Statements of a similar character are made in another case
which, however, is usually cited for the proposition that gross negligence
may constitute fraud. Aetna Insurance Co. v. Reed, 33 Ohio St. 283
(1877). Liability is dearly predicated on falsity alone in Douglas v.
Plotkin, 13 Ohio C.C. 461, 7 Ohio C.D. 159 (1897).
The principal case, since the evidence indicated the defendant could
not by ordinary care have known of the mistake, amounts to a holding
that a deceit action cannot be maintained without proof of knowledge or
negligence. This is to be distinguished from actions for rescission or
breach of warranty where a material false representation is sufficient.
Mulvey v. King, 39 Ohio St. 491 (1883); Carr v. Mi/er, 2 Ohio
App. 430, 19 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 324 (1914); Gallipolis Furniture Co.
v. Symmes, 19 Ohio C.C. 659, 1O Ohio C.D. 514 (1900). If the
plaintiff had refused to accept the land or pay the purchase price, a
different problem would have been presented but inasmuch as he has
continued in possession of the premises for four years, his action is dearly
deceit. Most of the cases are in agreement that falsity alone is insuffi-
cient; Douglas v. Plotkin, supra, a lower court case, is contra.
The decision sheds little light on the problem of whether a negli-
gently false statement will be sufficient for deceit. There are cases that
say that the statement muist be made with knowledge of the falsity; a
larger number in Ohio, that a negligently false statement is sufficient.
Between these views are assertions that the statements must have been
knowingly false or grossly negligent. The principal case says that to
establish liability defendant must be shown to have been guilty of "cul-
pable negligence." The expression is unfortunate. Is culpable negli-
gence more than ordinary negligence? Is it equivalent to gross negli-
gence? Are degrees of negligence to be recognized in deceit cases in
Ohio? The leading English case of Peek v. Derry, supra, holds flatly
that a false statement negligently made is not sufficient for an action of
deceit and a majority of the American cases purport to follow this view.
With numerous statements in the Ohio cases both for and against the
doctrine, a new authoritative statement by the Supreme Court that would
definitely align Ohio with or against the majority American view that
knowledge of the falsity is essential to an action in deceit, would be
helpful. ANNA FAYE BLACKBURN
DEFAMATION
LIBEL AND SLANDER - ORAL STATEMENTS HELD TO BE LIBEL
INSTEAD OF SLANDER
The plaintiff was an electrical contractor in the city of Elyria,
Ohio. Being a strong proponent of municipal ownership, he, both
voluntarily and by request, advised public officials in northern Ohio
against accepting the rate proposals of the defendant company. In Sep-
tember of 1932 the company received an anonymous letter attacking
the plaintiff's character and reputation. This was forwarded to the
defendant's general manager in Cleveland who selected certain state-
ments from the letter and deleted all portions favorable to the plaintiff.
A short time later the citizens of Amherst were considering the sale of
their local distributing system to the company, and, on October 13,
arranged a public discussion meeting at which the general manager
was to speak. The plaintiff spoke in opposition to the proposal. Follow-
ing his remarks the general manager arose and announced to the
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